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Another Look at Calderon's El principe
constante as Tragedy
Matthew D. Stroud

THE FORMS AND DEFINITIONS OF TRAGEDY HAVI� BEEN A FREQUENT PRE
occupation for James Parr over the course of his distinguished ca
reer. One of his more influential articles was "El principe constante
and the Issue of Christian Tragedy," published in 1986. Parr's
approach was primarily ethical and formalist, dealing with the Aris
totelian requirements of tragedy: arete, hubris, catharsis. He coun
tered the long and distinguished scholarship that maintains that
Christian tragedy is an impossibility by reconsidering, even rede
fining, hamartia and anagnorisis, and essentially ignoring peripe
teia. Hamartia, in his reading, is much more than a flaw or an
error. Instead, relying on the work of Peter Alexander, Parr as
serted that hamartia involves the responsibility of the protagonist,
who brings his misfortune upon himself. Regarding anagnorisis,
that moment when the protagonist realizes what he has done, Parr
accepted that a Christian martyr would experience no such mo
ment of insight, and thus made anagnorisis a function of the
reader or spectator. By adopting this different model, and by paying
much more attention to matters such as suffering and justice, he
was able to conclude that, despite its differences from Oedipus and
Antigone, Calderon's martyr play should be considered tragedy.
Parr himself acknowledged that the models he used allowed mar
tyrdom and tragedy to come together: "The play displays all the in
gredients necessary for tragedy as that form is defined in the
theoretical models adduced here. Other models would yield differ
ent results, undeniably" (172). Rather than revisit the vast and fa
miliar literature on tragedy and the debates on whether or not this
particular work meets Aristotle's definition, perhaps it would be
more useful to come at the issue from a different perspective-that
of psychoanalysis, the insights of which have radically altered the
17
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direction of literary theory and criticism in the last thirty years. Jac
ques Lacan, the figure whose work underlies enormous stretches

fuels the crime. Tragedy, in other words, is about the desire that
subverts all law (263-65, 277), about transgressions of the sym

of cultural studies, queer studies, and even feminist studies, dedi
cated a significant portion of his Seminar VJJ, The Ethics ofPsycho

bolic law that must be punished by death. Indeed, in a very real

analysis (1992) to a consideration of tragedy. Many of Lacan's
notions are not wholly different from those Parr discusses: the
focus on death, the exalted nature of the experience, and the calm
ing effect of catharsis, for example. Some differ with Parr's inter
pretations because they are more traditionalist, while others differ
because they spring from his work in psychoanalysis rather than
Greek philosophy. All of them, however, deal with desire.
Desire is in play in all forms of serious drama. Aristotelian tragedy
wants to suppress desire, and it is willing to use violence to reach its
goals. Christian martyrdom takes the violence offered by others and
makes that violence the object of desire. For the Christian martyr,
however, life not only does not end at the death of the body, but the
promise of eternal afterlife causes one's corporeal existence, and
even one's identity, to be essentially meaningless. Moreover, be
cause one's motivations are based on things one cannot see and on
the experience of the soul, a part of one's identity that one cannot
locate physically, martyrdom is at root irrational, especially when
one adds into the mix the additional desire for pain and suffering,
for the mortification of the flesh, on the way to death. Despite the
best efforts of Saint Thomas Aquinas, whose scholasticism might be
oversimplified as "Do irrational things for rational reasons," the dis
cussion of martyrdom underscores how profoundly un-Aristotelian
Christian thought is in this regard.
In his Seminar VII, Lacan appears to accept on its face some of
the terminology of tragedy, although he dispenses with the familiar
and comforting notion that tragedy teaches us to be better people.
Catharsis, he notes, is intended to calm the spectators, to purge
them of fear and pity (245, 248), and he follows traditional defini
tions of tragedy by rendering hamartia as "error" (258). Nothing
Lacan wrote, however, was divorced from his notion of the insis
tence of desire, and all his assertions regarding tragedy are conse
quently nuanced and altered. At the heart of tragedy is a crime, but

hamartia alone is not the crime for which tragedy atones. Instead,
tragedy results when one crosses a boundary of desire, when some
thing happens that frees humanity from its own laws. Rather than
hamartia, it is ate, or blind ambition and reckless impulse, that

sense, tragedy is about the "triumph of death" (313), not just a
death sentence meted out to punish the commission of the crime.
'Iragedy is everywhere inhabited by death; there is a quality on the
part of the protagonists of being between life and death or already
dead in life (248, 271, 280). Tragedy embraces death and the death
drive; it highlights "the relationship of man to his lack of being"

(298) and points out that to achieve one's desire is to achieve one's
own death (294). It is here that the death drive and the symbolic
meet in perfect symbiosis, for the symbolic law is enforced by vio
lence. Ultimately, the tragic protagonists are unable to resist the
weight and pressure of the symbolic and lose either the objects of
their desires or their lives. 1 At the end of the play, as it reestablishes
the absolute authority of the symbolic law, tragedy also serves to
purify the imaginary register (245, 248). As a result of tragic cathar
sis, one should leave the theater content to lay down one's desire
and reenter the symbolic universe. While tragedy may deal with
ethics and the search for good, it is ultimately not moral (323), pri
marily because the Good, like the Other, is not whole. There is no
Supreme Good (300): "The good cannot reign over all without an
excess emerging whose fatal consequences are revealed to us in
tragedy" (259).2
How does Calderon's El pr{ncipe constante fit into this view of
tragedy? There is no doubt that this martyr play is about death:
death in war, death for one's religious convictions, even intima
tions of metaphorical death in matters of love. Fenix and Muley are
as good as dead because her father has promised her in marriage
to another man without regard for her desire, and Muley notes that
Fenix should have died before accepting Tarudante's portrait ( 455-

56). Even more pointedly, Muley threatens that the only way Taru
dante will be able to have Fenix is if he kills Muley first (1049-50).
T hese familiar metaphors from the tradition of courtly love are in
cidental to the primary scenes of death in the play: the battle for
Ceuta and the martyrdom of Prince Fernando. From the outset
there is a pall of death hanging over the entire expedition, one
heightened by the fact that we in the audience know that the in
vasion of Morocco will be a colossal disaster. While Fernando an
ticipates the upcoming defeat of Morocco as a great victory for
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Christendom,3 Enrique is more realistic as he worries about the in
evitable loss of life.

echada juzgo contra ml la suerte
desde que de Lisboa, al salir solo,
imagenes he visto de la muerte.

There are other important ways, however, in which Fernando's
plight differs from traditional notions of tragedy. Let us return to

Parr.4 Perhaps "crime" is too strong a word; but even if one uses
"mistake" or "transgression," what does Fernando do that meets

I M y soul is full of fear,
I judge luck to be against me,
since I left Lisbon alone
I have seen images of my death.)

the criteria for those terms? Unlike Oedipus, he commits no act
that he himself would recognize as abominable once he discovers

(517-20)
This is, after all, war; it is expected not only that both sides will
attempt to kill their enemies but that both sides will die for their
respective causes as well. Fernando, the "constant prince" of the
title, sums up his mission quite succinctly: "a morir venimos" [we
come to die] (870). He realizes that his death is inevitable ("iAy
Don Juan, cierta es mi muerte!" [Oh, Don Juan, certain is my
death!], 1211), and his belief that he has come to die fulfills La
can's requirement that the protagonists in tragedy are everywhere
implicated in death. After his capture, Fernando, like Antigone,
considers himself already dead:

what he did. Unlike Antigone, he violates no law. He is, again, the
"perfect" prince, and the concept of perfection would seem to
erase any possibility of hamartia. It might be argued that Fernando
does exhibit ate, a reckless, impulsive desire to conquer souls and
land for Christianity, but what makes ate tragic for Lacan is its use
in the subversion of the symbolic law. In El principe constante,
there is not the slightest hint that Fernando is acting in any way
outside the law. His situation also challenges Lacan's assertion that
the defiance of the law in tragedy is related to the absence of Su
preme Good. A situation such as that between Antigone and Creon,
which is a battle between one good and another, is impossible in
the Christian context of living and dying for God. Indeed, the mar
tyr's desire is not to subvert the law, but to surrender himself com
pletely to its violence, to give his life for the law, thus bringing into

Morir es perder el ser,

harmony imaginary desire and symbolic violence.

yo l e perdi en una guerra;

The evidence of Fernando's surrender is clear and abundant. In
stead of resisting capture and confinement, he embraces his mis
ery: "aprendo a ser infelice" [I learn to be unhappy] (1117). His

perdi el ser, luego morf;
mori, luego ya no es cuerda
hazafla que por un muerto

tantos
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the notion of hamartia. Parr asserts that this Greek term, properly
defined as "error," as Lacan noted, must be redefined if El p{ncipe
constante is to be considered a tragedy, but there is a much longer
scholarly tradition that would agree more with Lacan than with

El alma traigo de temores llena

hoy

PRINCIPE CONSTANTE

plight provokes no newly revealed moral insight, as was the case
with Oedipus. He wants to die, not because he has done anything

vivos perezcan.

to

[To die is to lose one's being,

I lost it in a war;
I lost my being, therefore I died;
I died, therefore it is not wise
for so many to perish today

deserve it, but for his faith:
porque los cielos me cumplan
un deseo de morir

por la fe....

for a dead man.)

(1371-76)

lso that the heavens may fulfill
to die
for faith . . ..]
my desire

The trajectory of life leads to death (1441-44, 1598-99); to be born
is tQ live subject to fortune and death (1640-41).

(2420-22; cf. 906)
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Blameless himself, he conceives of his duty, like that of all saints,
as that of suffering for others, of paying their debts (Lacan 1992,
322). He loses his sense of fear, a hallmark of martyrdom (Lacan
1992, 267). He offers his slavery as a service to God:
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[Oh, if only
my words could move one
to piety, then would I
live to suffer at least
one more i nstant !]
(2255-59)

si es decirme
que es mi esclavitud eterna,
eso es lo que mas deseo;
albricias pedir pudieras,
y en vez de dolor y luto,
vestir galas y hacer fiestas.

At the end of his life, Fernando urges the Portuguese onward to
victory in battle (2603-13). His compatriots understand his death
to be payment on a future military victory (2588-91), thus com
pleting the symbolic victory of the law over the individual subject.
At the same time, Fernando's death is so much more than the
mere symbolic exchange of individual desire for the supremacy of
the law, mostly because Fernando actively seeks out his misery and
death. Fernando's desire to suffer and die for God bespeaks thejou
issance that lies at the heart of this play, the jouissance associated

[if it is to tell me
that my slavery is eternal,
that is what I most desire;
you could have asked for favors
and instead of pain and mourning
dressed in finery and rejoiced.]
(1221-26)
This rejection of fear also evacuates fear and pity from the concept
of catharsis. Rather than calming desire in the spectator, this reli
gious spectacle is intended to instill even greater fervor among the
faithful. Indeed, he explicitly tells us that he hopes that other
Christians will look upon his example as one who upholds his faith
and reveres God in spite of misfortune and mistreatment (141114).
Fernando repeatedly makes manifest and exalts that which is
normally hidden: the death drive, the fading of the self. The appeal
to the Other is not an imaginary demand for a state of wholeness

with the death drive, the jouissance of the martyr, the jouissance
that is not, of course, pleasure in any usual sense but that is experi
enced in the conscious as misery, illness, or instability. It is only in
the unconscious, in direct contact with the death drive that jouis
sance is perceived by the lacking subject as pleasure (Lacan 1989,
60, 95). In addition, jouissance is not just an admission that one is
lacking as a subject but that contact with the lack, the real, pro
duces the ecstasy experienced by all martyrs and mystics (Lacan
1982, 147); as such, it is a function of the nature of God. It is here
that a certain notion of beauty comes into play. Part of the Chris
tian notion of suffering for one's faith is the idea that a certain es
sential beauty is revealed by the loss, the cruelty, and the horror.
In this aspect at least, Christian and Lacanian notions of tragedy

the Other that the martyr appeals. By the middle of act 3, Fernando

coincide, for La.can agrees that beauty is revealed in the moment of
transgression and its accompanying blindness as related to the
death drive (Lacan 1992, 281). It is "precisely the function of the

revels in the lack in the Other. He embraces his unhappiness, and

beautiful to reveal to us the site of man's relationship to his own

he makes of it the object of his desire:

death, and to reveal it to us only in a blinding flash" (La.can 1992,
295).

that the Other itself cannot provide. Indeed, it is to the very lack in

i Oh si pudiera
mi voz mover a piedad
a alguno, porque siquiera
un instante mas viviera
padeciendo!

All the terms used thus far are also involved in the definition of
one's identity, which is formed through the interplay of real lack,
symbolic metaphorization and repression, and imaginary fantasies
of wholeness. The Aristotelian concepts most closely linked to iden
tity are arete, that is, nobility or high rank, and hubris, a pride that
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does not allow one to see one's O\.\'Tl shortcomings or lack. In Aristo
telian models of tragedy, part of the problem stems from one's faith
in one's belief in a unified, rational, subject identity. Likewise,
much of the drama of the tragic climax and denouement is also a
function of protagonists who act according to what they believe to
be the expectations given who they are. In other words, Greek trag
edy assumes that the subject is whole, and that one can rationally
comprehend one's surroundings. In other words, the Greek tragic
protagonist is the quintessential phallic subject. In addition, Aristo
telian tragedy posits a number of other givens: that life ends at
death, that death can be avoided by making no mistakes, and that
one's infliction of pain and punishment upon oneself in the face of
adversity is the noblest assertion of the identity of the subject. In
deed, the tragedy in the case of Oedipus resides precisely in the
errors he committed in his aggressive, arrogant attempt to over
come his fate, and his assertion of hjs essential morality in his self
blinding. As a moral subject, one is to assume, he could not fail to
atone for his errors, however unintentional they were. The suffer
ing he endured only served to underscore his essential arete, even
if ms actions were misguided because of ms overconfidence and
pride.
While Oedipus may have suffered to ensure the integrity of his
symbolic and imaginary identity, Fernando embraces his jouis
sance as pleasurable unpleasure, as he experiences the real lack
that underlies and informs the subject. Unlike either Oedipus or
Antigone, the focus is not upon physical suffering as some expiatory
punishment ultimately connected to who they are and why they are
doing what they are doing. Instead, Fernando, who is not being
punished for any crime, rejoices in the physical blows to the body.
His suffering is not considered to be a blow to phallic signification
but rather the apotheosis (both figurative and literal) of the lacking
soul, a position associated in Lacanian psychoanalysis with the
feminine. Oedipus may be the phallic tragic hero, but for Lacan
sainthood (or, more precisely, mysticism, and, we may assume,
martyrdom) is linked to feminine sexuality. Such individuals nota
ble for their rellgious devotion are either women, like Santa Teresa
de Avila, or "highly gifted people like Saint John of the Cross"
(Lacan 1982, 146-47), that is, men who identify with femininity
and the way it embraces real lack and experiences the jouissance
of giving oneself over to the Other.
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Fernando's suffering points out the triangular relationship
among identity, desire, and the body. The body desires, desire
structures identity, and both identity and desire reside in the body.
Desire both uses the body and transforms it at the same time that
the body experiences desire. Identity, which is in part a function of
the symbolically repressed ego, inscribes the body at the same time
that the body itself helps determine identity. Between identity and
desire, the relationship is more conflicted and dire: identity smoth
ers desire; desire shatters identity. The symbolic culture works tire
lessly to maintain identity (and difference) at the expense of desire.
If in part one's identity can be said to be constituted by one's signi
fication within and definition by one's society, then it is apparent
that desire is antithetical to identity. In other words, desire is oppo
site from and serves to undermine one's identity. While the body
cannot help but serve as the conveyor of one's identity as one goes
out and represents oneself physically in society, it is likewise true
that the experience of the body in society inscribes, alters, and re
signifies the body, and even influences its very contours (Butler 3,
15, 30).
Into this mix, Bersani and Deleuze add one more essential ingre
dient that cannot be omitted without eliminating an essential part
of Fernando's experience: masocmsm. The martyr, for whom pain
is pleasure, seeks out the shattering of identity and longs to disap
pear into the gap between signification and identity. In terms of the
language used, in terms of the intimacy of the two bodies involved,
and in terms of the emotional connection, there is definitely a
strong thread of sensuality and eroticism in the play, not between
Muley and Fen.ix, whose relationship is as coldly conventional as
any, but between Fernando and the king who causes his body to
feel the desired sensations. Central to the plot is violence, the one
term that binds body, desire, and identity together more than any
other. For Butler (29), materiality is "founded through a set of vio
lations" that has the effect of preventing the establishment of stable
signification. The self-image one has of the body is purchased
through a certain loss (Butler 75). At the same time, the "symbolic
marks the body by sex through threatening that body, through the
deployment/production of an imaginary threat, a castration, a pri
vation of some bodily part" (Butler 101). Freud goes a long way
toward equating civilization with violence, and Bersani makes the
connection explicit: "destructiveness is constitutive of sexuality,"
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he says; "Sexuality
aggressiveness
civilization" (20, 21). Fer
nando takes advantage of war and the cruelties that enemies inflict
=

=

upon one another in order to place himself in a situation in which
he will be sure to be punished, humiliated, and mortified. The
prince takes additional steps to ensure that his misery is on full
public display, calling to mind Theodore Reik's "demonstrative" or
persuasive feature of masochism, explained by Deleuze as "the par
ticular way in which the masochist exhibits his suffering, embar
rassment and humiliation" (Deleuze 75). Tragedy also embodies
violence, but in a much different way. Tragic heroes participate in
violence in the commission of a crime, in resistance to authority,
and in acts of expiation, all of which reflect either imaginary desire
or symbolic control, but never as a medium toward the goal of expe
riencing the lack in the real.
A second characteristic is passivity and the concomitant desire to
be punished. The masochist specifically seeks out a passive posi
tion, even going so far as to enlist another to assume the role of the
active subject who will satisfy his fantasy by inflicting punishment
(Deleuze 105-6). Although the King of Fez repeatedly seeks a way
out of his role as torturer, Fernando will not hear of it and insists
on receiving more humiliation. Indeed, the masochist, just as the
martyr, refuses to resist the violence of the symbolic society, in
stead aligning himself with it and using it for his pleasurable un
pleasure. Reflecting the characteristic of masochism that Reik
termed "provocative fear," Fernando, in Deleuze's terms, "aggres
sively demands punishment since it resolves anxiety and allows
him to enjoy the forbidden pleasure" (75). Deleuze even adds an
other characteristic to Reik's, the masochistic contract that "im
plies not only the necessity of the victim's consent, but his ability to
persuade, and ... to train his torturer" (75). The King of Fez has
unwittingly entered into this contract with Fernando. He does not
wish to punish the prince, and cannot understand why the prince
wants to be punished, but he does Fernando's bidding and pun
ishes him anyway. In addition, it is not enough for the masochist or
martyr to put himself in harm's way and be dispatched. An impor
tant part of the experience is extending the suffering, luxuriating
in the anticipation of the pain, waiting for, even delaying, the inevi
table death (75). Fernando does not want a quick death; the draw
ing out of his masochistic dance with the king allows him to suffer
all the more, rejoicing in the anticipation of the next application of
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pain. Tragedy as traditionally defined is a statement for the dignity
of the human spirit, not for its passivity in seeking out its degrada
tion.
Masochism is always accompanied by a " 'resexualization' of the
conscience. "5 The simultaneous production of pleasure and un
pleasure, which clearly describes Fernando's experience and that
of most martyrs, is also a definition of sexuality, according to
Bersani in his discussion of Freud's Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality. In sexuality, "pleasure is somehow distinct from satis
faction, perhaps even identical to a kind of pain" (34). Moreover,
intense feelings and experiences, even terrifying ones, always in
volve sexuality (37). The escalating cycle of pleasurable unpleasure
and its satisfaction is at odds with the civilized and orderly func
tioning of the individual, a condition that is absolutely related to
one's identity in the Symbolic.For Bersani, sexuality is not "an ex
change of intensities between individuals, but rather a condition
of broken negotiations with the world, a condition in which others
merely set off the self-shattering mechanisms of masochistic jouis

sance" (41). Sexual excitement, that is, sexuality made manifest,
"is intolerable to the structured self" (38); for the masochist, it can
only be "relieved and fulfilled by death" (46).
To counter the argument that Fernando's relationship with the
king and others is manifestly not sexual, one notes that even in re
ligious depictions, perhaps particularly in certain religious de
pictions of saints, the body is represented "as always at least
potentially sexualized, as a truly polysemous surface where various
significances and expressions-including a variety of erotic ones
compete and collude with each other in making the body meaning
ful" (Rambuss 268). Freud believed that the body is always and
everywhere sexualized, that it is essentially not possible for the
body to interact with the world around it in a purely nonsexual way.
All parts of the body, including the internal organs, are capable of
producing sexual response, but the sexual is detached from "both
object-specificity and organ-specificity. We desire what nearly shat
ters us, and the shattering experience is, it would seem, without

any specific content" (Bersani 39-40). Fernando not only does not
try to rid himself of this "shattering tension," he takes advantage of
his situation as captive to seek it out, to repeat and augment it, to
glory in his mortifications that are both unpleasurable and pleasur
able at the same time. For Christians, this life is meaningless in
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comparison to the rewards to come in life after death, a fantasy we
see played out in the final scenes of the play with Fernando's ap
pearance after death.6 Death is far from a punishment meted out
for a crime; it is a reward, the release of the soul through the shat
tering of the corporeal identity. For the martyr, the suffering and
death are the means to the shattering and jouissance he seeks, a
posture as different as one can imagine from that of the tragic hero,
who seeks justice and insists upon the dignity of the human spirit.
ln the final analysis, the beauty and the frustration of the notion
of tragedy is that, as Parr noted, it all depends upon the terms and
definitions one applies. One notes that studies of literary works as
tragedy, once a staple of literary criticism, have lost a good deal of
their appeal. ln our postmodern world, it is hard to imagine either
a tragic hero taking a stand at great personal cost for the dignity of
the human spirit or a critic fully embracing an Aristotelian defini
tion of tragedy without nuance or exception. For that reason, it

ANOTHER LOOK AT CALDER6N'S

to choose life with the concomitant loss. The payment on account for future hap

leads to yet another source of tragedy.
2. This summary of Lacanian notions regardin g tragedy is impossibly brief. For
a

more comprehensive discussion, see my Play in the Mirror (1996), chap . 4, es

pecially 132-39.
3. Fernando's arrogant assertions reveal his extraordinary imaginary pride
upon .landing in Morocco:
Yo he de ser el primero, Africa beUa,
que he cle pisar tu margen arenosa,
porque oprimida al peso

their suffering, it hardly seems like a sacrifice at all. Parr does not
consider desire and jouissance, yet when one explores Fernando's
motivations, his insistent desire to die, to be shattered, to experi
ence the unpleasurable pleasure ofjouissance, it is clear that in this
case the traditional definitions of tragedy simply cannot hold.

de mi huella

,

sientas en tu cerviz la poderosa

fuerza que ha de rendirte.

fl shall be the first, beautiful Africa,
to

tread your sandy shore,

so that, burdened by the weight of my step ,

you may feel on your neck the powerful

cipe constante as tragedy as it would be to assert that the view pre

a promise that we know cannot be fulfilled. There is no ultimate
reward, which makes the sacrifice all the more meaningful. For
Christian martyrs, promised the everlasting glory of paradise for
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piness would not seem to be too great if, in fact, the symbolic Other were able to
fulfill its promises. But the subject and the Other are both lacking, and, as a result,
it is impossible for the symbolic to fulfill its promises. The failure of the symbolic

would be as wrong to imply that Parr is wrong in his view of El prin
sented here is the only correct one possible. Still, the notion of
tragedy lingers. At heart in the debate over tragedy and martyrdom
is the nature of the desire that motivates the tragic heroes. Oedi
pus, Antigone, and even modern tragic heroes are willing to sacri
fice everything for justice, the law, and the symbolic good, even for

EL PRINCIPE CONSTANT£

force that will conquer you.)

(477-81)

4. The literature on hamartia is extensive, but the majority of scholars tend

toward a definition of the term as "fatal flaw" or "error if not "crime." The ex
tensive bibliography need not be reproduced here; rather, see J. M. Bremer's Ha
,"

martia: Tragic Error in the "Poetics" of Aristotle and in Greek Tragedy (1969),
especially 63.
5. Deleuze, "Coldness and Cruelty," 104. There is in addition a close link be

tween masochism and fetishism. There "can be no masochism without fetishism
in the primary sense," one manifestation of which is "supersensualism" (Deleuze
32).
6. Christian fantasies are related to the importance of ritual fantasy to the
masochist as well (Deleuze 74-75). For martyrs, the ritual of "regeneration and
rebirth" is paramount (94); the desire is not to destroy the world but "to disavow
and thu s to suspend it, in order to secure an ideal which is itself suspended in
fantasy" (32-33).
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